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Abstract
This article considers the mechanisms that permit and enhance the movement of
highly tacit component (technical) knowledge and geographically sticky architectural
knowledge across borders and between clusters and firms. We address a number of
critical research questions that relate to intra- and inter-locational knowledge transfer.
We use a theory-driven, longitudinal, single case study to develop a conceptual
framework to examine and describe how shifting the geography of knowledge sourcing
can facilitate architectural change by following the transformation of one business unit
within a specialist global organization through a series of evolutionary steps that
involved internalizing new component knowledge from other firms and locations,
transforming the company’s architectural knowledge through various transactions with
firms and individuals from a foreign cluster, and eventually radically transforming the
concept of the firm and its focus. We close by generalizing this model to address the
fundamental processes of the spatial aspects of organizational learning.
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1. Introduction
The spatial development of knowledge is of enduring interest to scholars of economic
geography and international business (Wood and Reynolds, 2011). In particular the
process of innovation and its engagement of dispersed networks provides an important
basis for the creation of competitive advantage both at the firm and the regional level
(Jenkins and Tallman, 2010; Bessant et al., 2012). The globalization of the world
economy has shifted the focus of knowledge development away from the local to
concern for knowledge transfers over what are often long distances (Bathelt and Henn,
2014). A variety of studies have addressed the flow of technology across borders
(Almeida et al., 2002; Feinberg and Gupta, 2004), often by considering changes in
patenting patterns (Almeida et al., 2002; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Feinberg and
Gupta, 2004). They typically consider how different relational architectures might
influence the ease and impact of technology transfer. Thus, Kogut (1991) discusses how
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national technological patterns limit the movement of tacit knowledge internationally,
Feinberg and Gupta (2004) show that technical knowledge moves more easily between
multinational firms that have similar national backgrounds, and Almeida et al. (2002)
show that patentable knowledge moves more easily in alliances than through markets
and more easily within firms than in alliances. Bathelt and Cohendet (2014) propose
that the interweaving of local and global knowledge dimensions result in channeling
knowledge through cross-national feedback loops.
However, the mechanisms and processes of transferring the complex, tacit, path-
dependent organization capabilities (Teece et al., 1997) or architectural knowledge
(Henderson and Clark 1990) that provide long-term competitive advantage are not
generally addressed or are seen as extremely difficult to pursue (Kogut, 1991; Szulanski,
1996; Tallman and Phene, 2007). Indeed, architectural or systemic knowledge is seen as
both organizationally and geographically sticky (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Saxenian,
1994; Tallman et al., 2004). Architectural knowledge is path dependent, built up over
time through idiosyncratic learning experiences not easily identified or assembled and,
therefore, is highly immobile. The embedded nature of this knowledge makes changes,
particularly directed and intentional changes, problematic even among geographically
separated subunits of a firm, much less when it has been imported from another
organization. Rather, when challenged by foreign competitors with new and superior
architectural understandings of the relevant system, firms initially fail to grasp the new
‘way of the world’, redouble their efforts at pursuing old ideas more efficiently under
old understandings, and eventually fail (Christensen, 1997). The implication for
economic geography is that in the face of such competency traps among constituent
firms, regional clusters too eventually will collapse (Pouder and St. John, 1996).
However, there are examples of firms that have undergone systemic change, usually
under conditions of near-failure, and have emerged as changed entities that have
become very successful. Changing the nature of the firm occurs mostly in crisis
situations when there is little to lose by rejecting the current architecture and attempting
to shift to a new conceptualization of the basis for advantage. IBM was changed by an
outsider CEO from a manufacturer of computers to an IT services and consulting firm
that does a bit of manufacturing on the side (Gerstner, 2003). Apple was near collapse
when Steve Jobs was rehired and transformed personal computing, music and personal
communication by restructuring the company to a new model that overwhelmed
more entrenched and divisionalized competitors; competitors that are now struggling
to adapt to the new structures imposed on their industries by Apple (Young and
Simon, 2005).
This article focuses on a firm that successfully renewed its organizational architecture
by importing knowledge from a foreign cluster in the same industry when the required
capabilities were not available locally (Bathelt and Cohendet, 2014). It explores the
mechanisms that permit and enhance the movement of highly tacit component
(technical) knowledge and even of very geographically sticky architectural knowledge
across borders and between clusters and firms. In doing so, it addresses a number of
critical research questions that relate to intra- and inter-locational knowledge transfer.
First, we consider what eventualities motivate firms to look for complex technologies
or new organizational routines and capabilities both locally and inter-regionally or
internationally. We see competitive pressures from other firms driving the search for
knowledge, but this then leads us to our second question, which is to understand when
and how a firm decides to import technical or component knowledge and when it shifts
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to seeking new architectural knowledge—new routines and processes for engaging in
this competition. Third, we seek improved understanding of methods of transmitting
such knowledge to include accessing local knowledge in foreign locations, attracting
knowledgeable individuals from other locations and firms as change agents, and
restructuring the core architectural characteristics of the focal firm.
We use a theory-driven, longitudinal, single case study to demonstrate that indeed the
‘organizational context’, the firm’s architectural understanding of its core processes, can
be changed by importing architectural knowledge from other firms in distant locations.
We develop a conceptual framework to examine and describe how shifting the
geography of knowledge sourcing can facilitate architectural change by following the
transformation of one business unit within a specialist global organization, Ferrari
Gestione Sportiva (FGS), through a series of evolutionary steps that involved
internalizing new component knowledge from other firms and locations, transforming
the company’s architectural knowledge through various transactions with firms and
individuals from a foreign cluster, and eventually transforming the concept of the firm
and its focus radically. These combine to provide a conceptual framework for
knowledge transformation that is explored through the analysis of individuals
interacting with a single firm, but which offers parallels to the roles played by
multinational firms tapping into and internalizing location-specific component and
architectural knowledge from various locations. We close by generalizing this model to
address the fundamental processes of organizational learning at various levels.
2. Knowledge and knowledge transfer among firms and clusters
Industrial clusters are ‘geographically proximate groups of interconnected companies
and associated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and
complementarities’ according to Porter (2000, 16). These clusters are often sources of
innovative technologies and processes for an industry. However, although Porter’s
(2000) framing of the cluster concept within the notion of regional competitive
advantage has gained much popular support, there are concerns relating to lack of
theoretical grounding to provide the basis for understanding and identifying the
underpinning mechanisms that create such regional capability (Martin and Sunley,
2003).
Clusters depend on the localized conditions that stimulate economic transformation
such as a confluence of private, public and quasi-public structures often framed as
institutional thickness (Henry and Pinch, 2001; Amin and Thrift, 2005). In this context,
place and spatial proximity are the key foundations of a socially embedded network of
relationships that enhance trust and knowledge generation and are, therefore, able to
stimulate greater levels of innovation and economic transformation (Granovetter,
1973). Such regional agglomerations are not unitary in their capabilities but are
sustained by a related variety of competences and complementary sectors (Boschma and
Iammarino, 2009). This geographical lens views the economic and social processes from
a spatial perspective, and although it emphasizes the embedded, path-dependent nature
of these processes, it also recognizes that agents such as organizations make choices
which may create shifts and transformations from these particular paths (Bathelt and
Gluckler, 2011).
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Within the body of work on clusters there has been a recognition of the importance of
distilling the nature of knowledge creation in agglomerations and attempting to isolate
the mechanisms which lead to firm learning and innovation (Malmberg and Maskell,
2002). One perspective for considering the movement of knowledge among firms within
clusters and between firms across cluster boundaries utilizes the concepts of component
and architectural knowledge (Henderson and Clark, 1990). Pinch et al. (2003, 379)
describe component knowledge, which ‘. . . refers to those specific knowledge resources,
skills and technologies that relate to identifiable parts of an organizational system,
rather than to the whole. Component knowledge is therefore normally tied to the
technology and operating norms of particular industrial sectors’. For example,
component knowledge in building racing cars may be very explicit, such as the
design and use of shock absorbers, pistons, turbochargers and other parts, or much
more complex and tacit, such as the use of aerodynamic design principles or exhaust
layouts. However, it is often tied to scientific and engineering principles and can be
measured, codified and transferred to other informed individuals and organizations.
Component knowledge must be organized into some larger framework to make a
system function, whereas architectural knowledge relates to the organization of such a
system and the structures and routines for organizing its component knowledge for
productive use (Matusik and Hill, 1998). Architectural knowledge is, therefore,
concerned with the relationship between an individual piece of component knowledge
and an overall system of knowledge (Pinch et al., 2003). Architectural knowledge is
tacit, complex, deeply embedded in individuals and organizations and highly path-
dependent (Tallman et al., 2004). Architectural knowledge exists at multiple levels, from
the work group (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003; Carlile,
2004) to the firm (Matusik and Hill, 1998), to the industry cluster (Pinch et al., 2003)
where it develops as firms interact within a geographically defined social network
milieu.
2.1. The process of managing knowledge flows
Henderson and Clark (1990) focus on three areas for managing knowledge flows:
communication channels, filters and problem-solving strategies—together these create
the knowledge architecture for the firm. Formal (licensing, alliances, acquisitions) and
informal (spillovers, social network interactions) communication channels for compo-
nent knowledge delimit the interactions essential for effective design development and
the relationships that underpin architectural knowledge. Organizations are constantly
bombarded with information through even these limited communication channels.
Therefore, firms must develop filters that allow them to identify immediately those
components that are most critical to them in the information stream (Arrow, 1974;
Daft and Weick, 1984). These filters are part of the firm’s architectural knowledge, as
they are a key part of the knowledge describing the relationships between the
components. As extant architectural frameworks tend to screen out information
that contradicts their expectations, hence information intakes tend to be limited to
component knowledge that fits within the existing framework of channels and filters;
information that might lead to changing the architectural framework is largely filtered
out. Specific communication channels and effective filters allow an organization to cope
with complexity by keeping information intakes limited and structured so that it is not
constantly recreating its organizational ‘dominant logic’ (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986)
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in response to random contextual variation. However, this same process tends to
prevent the firm from identifying fundamental disruptive change and exposes it to the
risk of building core rigidities for itself (Leonard-Barton, 1992).
Thus, architectural knowledge becomes implicit in the organization, and problem-
solving strategies are framed in the context of the existing architecture. Problem-solving
strategies tend to focus on improving efficiency at existing tasks/technologies, filtering
out supposedly irrelevant component knowledge to focus on easing absorption of the
relevant. Henderson and Clark (1990, 27) say that, ‘We have assumed that architectural
knowledge embedded in routines and channels becomes inert and hard to change.
Future research designed to investigate information filters, problem-solving strategies
and communication channels in more detail could explore the extent to which this could
be avoided.’ These concepts have been taken forward at the microlevel in addressing
some of the specific problems of knowledge moving across boundaries of different
working groups in an automotive setting (Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003; Carlile, 2004).
Our focus here, however, is to consider the explicit spatial aspects in the nature of these
flows.
2.2. The limits to knowledge transfer across geographic distance
Given that architectures for knowledge flow management develop in all organizations
to make fundamentally chaotic environments comprehensible, certain currently
accepted general rules of knowledge transfer can be described. First, highly tacit
architectural knowledge is essentially very difficult to transfer, often described as
‘sticky’ (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tallman et al., 2004). As it develops through
practice and experiential learning, with strong path dependency, and as all organiza-
tions, firms or clusters have different experiences, none will develop identical
architectural knowledge (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Further, all human systems have
some architectural concepts, and existing architectural knowledge provides filters to
resist the import of alternative systemic architectures. Second, while component
knowledge is transferred more easily, it moves even more quickly among organizations
that have higher absorptive capacities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) for each other’s
technical know-how due to their common architectural frameworks or sets of channels,
filters and problem-solving strategies. Due both to accessibility and absorptive
advantage related to common architectural knowledge (Tallman et al., 2004),
knowledge search and exchange tend to be local and incremental (Zucker et al., 1998).
Thus, new ideas move more quickly and clearly within firms than between firms, and
more quickly and clearly among firms within a geographical knowledge cluster than
across cluster boundaries, and similarly faster within a nation than across borders
(Kogut, 1991; Tallman and Phene, 2007). Therefore, performance differences can
persist between clusters, if one cluster-level architectural framework provides a more
competitive framework than others, and within clusters, if one firm has superior private
architectural knowledge to others. Over time, competitive pressures cause firms to
incorporate new component knowledge, though their unique architectures may apply it
differently, and also to attempt to develop new architectural knowledge. However, such
efforts are difficult, lengthy and uncertain due to the tacit and embedded nature of
architectural knowledge that makes copying other architectures or even directed
internal development of innovative architectural knowledge uncertain at best.
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Architectural knowledge is embedded in the structure and information processes of
established organizations or clusters of organizations, and therefore these organizations
struggle to recognize and respond to threats from innovations in architectural
knowledge (Henderson and Clark, 1990). Path dependency suggests that a firm’s
experience with an evolving technology shapes its architectural knowledge to reflect an
organizational dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986), dominant design
(Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) or technological trajectory (Jenkins and Floyd,
2001).1 Once a particular product design architecture becomes accepted as dominant,
change and development tend to be focused on component areas, whereas the
architecture behind the product or technology becomes taken for granted. Similarly,
when a particular organizational logic is accepted and standardized, top management
use this logic to address all organizational issues (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986),
management learning focusing on new component areas rather than new architectures.
The consequence is that incumbent firms tend to be displaced in instances of disruptive
change to which they cannot adapt (Christensen, 1997) and clusters of firms eventually
become so enmeshed in internal knowledge flows and intra-cluster competition
that they fail to respond to superior innovation from external sources (Pouder and
St. John, 1996).
We consider that these issues are particularly difficult in international industries,
where firms are separated by geographical space and also by differences in cluster-level
architectural knowledge and national-level institutional differences (Tallman and
Phene, 2007); what could be referred to as differences in place (Lorenzen et al., 2012).
There is an extensive literature describing the international transfer of knowledge (e.g.,
Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000), but most of it focuses on the transfer of technology or
component knowledge. Rosenkopf and Almeida (2003) propose the idea that alliances
and/or the transfer of individuals may increase technological exchange by some process
of increasing contextual similarity. However, their results from an empirical test of
secondary data are not supportive of the idea of importing context. Szulanski (1996)
and Kogut and Zander (1993) describe and demonstrate the difficulties of moving
highly tacit knowledge across borders, even within firms. Kogut (1991) suggests that
moving complex knowledge across borders is very slow and difficult except within a
multinational firm—and even then is difficult due to cultural and institutional (what
might be considered national-level architectural knowledge or dominant logic)
differences. Moving tacit, embedded, contextually sticky architectural knowledge
internationally from a cluster in one country to a firm (in another cluster) in another
country is near impossible—or so the majority of models insist (Markusen, 1999).
However, as rare as it may be that a firm is able to undergo the process of
reconstructing its organizational architecture, we propose that this process does occur,
could occur more frequently and would be of great value to incumbent organizations if
it were expressed in a generalized framework. The remainder of this article uses the case
of FGS to examine how architectural knowledge develops in a firm based in a
1 Prahalad and Bettis (1986, 490) use ‘dominant logic’ to describe the ‘way in which managers conceptualize
the business and make critical resource allocation decisions. . . ’. Abernathy and Utterback (1978) use
‘dominant design’ to describe standardization of product design on a set of common attributes across a
product category. We will use ‘dominant logic’ to describe architectural knowledge at the organizational
level and ‘dominant design’ in reference to the architecture of technical knowledge about the racing car
itself.
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geographical cluster, how it interacts with knowledge embedded in another cluster in a
distant location and how an architectural framework can be recreated under conditions
of extreme competitive pressures when faced with alternative successful architectures.
We observe the process of architectural development and evolution in FGS over the
period 1929–2008 and derive a conceptual model of the mechanisms underlying the
import of architectural knowledge. It is important to note that FGS had only a limited
sense of what it was trying to accomplish in renewing and restructuring its knowledge
base—indeed, many of what will be seen as critical decisions were driven by expediency
or individual preferences unrelated to, even seemingly destructive of, successful
knowledge transfer. We argue that the planned and unplanned process followed by
Ferrari reflects concepts from learning theory, however, and finish by presenting a
conceptual model for cross-border architectural knowledge transfer.
3. The case study
3.1. The case method and industry context
The research in this article follows a longitudinal, multistage case study design
(Yin 1984; Leonard-Barton, 1990). It focuses on major periods in the history of
Ferrari’s racing operations. Ferrari has one of the most successful global brands in the
automotive industry, regularly appearing in global brand rankings (e.g., Interbrand,
2013). Key aspects of their brand strength are sporting heritage and reputation. We
chart their progression in the sporting arena from a locally focused specialist car
manufacturer to a globally dominant operation that is now the most successful in the
history of Formula 1 (F1) motorsport. We use a theoretical sampling approach
(Eisenhardt, 1989) to focus on this organization. Our approach can be described as a
multilevel comparative analysis in that we consider the organization at both the
architectural and component levels, making comparisons across different time periods
(Burgelman, 2002). Our approach is to move beyond the descriptive and to use
qualitative research to develop theory, but we do so with an explicit recognition of prior
concepts and relationships (Birkinshaw et al., 2011). We apply Henderson and Clark’s
(1990) concept of architectural and component knowledge as a framing for our
interrogation of the case material through the areas of activity they identify as
supporting existing architectural knowledge: communication channels, filters and
problem-solving strategies. We also specifically focus on variations in the spatial aspects
of the firm, most notably the location of facilities and partnerships during these periods
(Jenkins and Tallman, 2010). We use this interrogation of the case data to generate a
series of propositions that delineate the changes involved in developing component and
architectural knowledge and the potential importance of localization in this process.
Ferrari is chosen because it demonstrates transitions through periods of environ-
mental change and also, as our theoretical lens focuses on shifts in architectural
knowledge, is the one firm which has survived through a series of changes in the
dominant design of the F1 racing car. F1 racing itself offers strong evidence of
geographical clustering of architectural and component knowledge (Jenkins and
Tallman, 2010) and established standards of design and performance (Jenkins, 2010).
Our selection of respondents is purposeful, as we have sought to explore the technical
shifts and strategic changes that were made during this period. Table 1 provides a
summary of the respondents, their roles and their affiliations. As Table 1 illustrates, the
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interviews were undertaken between 1999 and 2004. The purpose of these interviews
was to develop a deeper understanding of the shifting basis of competitive advantage
for Ferrari from the 1970s through to the 2000s. Although the focus of the interviews
did not specifically concern the geographic aspects of the company strategy, the broader
focus on competitive performance and the reasons behind this created a rich picture
from which the geographic dimensions emerged as a key construct in the ability of the
organization to both develop and change its approach to innovation. Part of the
discussion in the interviews necessarily focused on past events that often allowed a more
open reflection on causal dynamics than would be the case with contemporary accounts
(Hargadon and Yellowlees, 2001). All of the interviews were fully transcribed and the
transcriptions analyzed in detail through the framework outlined in Table 1.
We also accessed a wide range of secondary data sources including autobiographies
and biographies of key players, and a range of specialist motorsport magazines that had
been published since the 1950s. These are outlined in Table 2. The use of a wide variety
of secondary data enable such recollections to be checked against contemporaneous
events to ensure that as comprehensive picture as possible is developed.
Table 3 represents two key aspects of the industry and spatial context. First, it lists
the key areas of component knowledge within the design and development of F1 racing
cars. These component areas are taken from an engineering forum for motorsport
technologies and hence represent particular technological elements and knowledge
domains that are required for the creation of these specialist vehicles. Second, it
distinguishes between the architectural characteristics of two key geographically
agglomerating regions—‘Motor Valley’ in Emilia Romagna (www.motorvalley.com),
an area in northern Italy around Milan and Bologna, which includes the city of
Modena, and the area known as ‘Motorsport Valley’ in the UK which represents
a crescent area to the north, west and south of London (www.the-mia.com/
The-Industry). Both of these areas have been identified as demonstrating the distinctive
capabilities of global clusters, with the British cluster receiving detailed consideration
in the economic geography literature (Henry et al., 1996; Henry and Pinch, 1999; Pinch
and Henry, 1999).
In the case of the Italian region,Motor Racing developed in the 1930s led by Alfa Romeo
of Milan who had recruited Enzo Ferrari to run their racing department in Modena.
Table 1. Details of interview respondents
Respondent FGS role and involvements Date of interviews
John Barnard Technical Director, Ferrari 1986–1989





Ross Brawn Technical Director Ferrari 1997–2006 24 June 2004
Mauro Forghieri Various technical positions through to Technical Director,
Ferrari 1962–1987
18 October 1999
Paolo Martinelli Various technical positions through to Engine Director,
Ferrari 1978–2006
24 June 2004
Jean Todt Sporting Director and then CEO Ferrari 1993–2007. 24 June 2004
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Table 2. Details of secondary sources
Title and author Publication details
Beck-Burridge, M., Walton, J. (2000) London: Macmillan Press.
Britain’s Winning Formula: Achieving World
Leadership in Motorsports.
Chapman, C. (1958) Motor Racing Magazine, October 1958,
71–72.Colin Chapman explains why lightweight cars are
safer.
Colombo, G. (1985) Yeovil, Somerset: Haynes Publishing.
Origins of the Ferrari Legend: Memories of the
Designer of the Earliest Ferrari Cars.
Couldwell, C. (2003) London: Virgin Books.
Formula One: Made in Britain.
Crombac, G. (2001) (re-issued version) Yeovil, Somerset: Haynes
Publishing.Colin Chapman: The Man and His Cars.
Ferrari, E. (translated by Ivan Scott) (1963) London: Hamish Hamilton.
The Enzo Ferrari Memoirs.
Lawrence, M. (1998) Croydon: Motor Racing Publications.
Grand Prix Cars 1945–1965.
Motorsport All editions 1950–2004.
Nye, D. (1993) Richmond: Hazleton Publishing.
The Autocourse History of the Grand Prix Car.
1945–1965.
Robson, G. (1999) Somerset: Haynes Publishing.
Cosworth: The Search for Power.
Autosport All editions 1950–2004.
F1 Racing March 1996–2004.
Williams, R. (2001) London: Random House.
Enzo Ferrari: A Life.
Yates, B. (1991) London: Doubleday.
Enzo Ferrari: The Man and the Machin.
Table 3. Core and peripheral subsystems Northern Italy versus Britain’s Motorsport Valleya
Italian Motor Valley Britain’s Motorsport Valley
Core subsystem Engine and transmission Chassis/Materials
aerodynamics
Peripheral subsystems Chassis/Materials Engines and transmissions
Aerodynamics Braking Braking
Electronics Electronics
Tyres and wheels Tyres and wheels
Fuels and lubricants Fuels and lubricants
Safety Safety
aThese categories have been adapted from the key knowledge domains used to define the
track for the Society of Automotive Engineers’ Motorsport Engineering Symposium in 2005.
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At that time Motor Racing was dominated by long-distance racing on public
roads with events such as France’s Le Mans and Italy’s Mille Miglia. With Italy’s
aerospace sector effectively dismantled following World War 2, and a focus on high-
speed public road races, the postwar focus was to privilege the engine as the source
of competitive performance. This meant that the firms active in Motor Valley in the
1950s—Ferrari, Alfa Romeo, Maserati and Lancia—all focused on engine develop-
ment, with their technical managers all coming from a background of engine design.
This created a horizontally based agglomeration cluster with a particular view on
the primacy of knowledge domains. This leads to the inference in Table 3, that the
architectural knowledge of the Italian region was focused first and foremost on engine
development.
In contrast, the British cluster had developed in the 1950s through small light cars
designed to compete on closed circuits, often disused airfields—such as RAF
Silverstone—that provided tarmac surfaces for racing. This racing culture developed
in the same region as an ongoing, but diminishing, aerospace cluster that provided a
source of scientists and engineers in areas such as materials and aerodynamics and also
unique facilities such as wind tunnels for testing designs. In contrast to the Italians,
the British designs focused on making the cars agile rather than powerful, with an
emphasis on the development of the chassis (Chapman, 1958) and later on the
application of aerodynamics. In the early 1950s, the Italian region dominated F1.
However, after a series of accidents involving fatalities among spectators in the mid-
and late-1950s, racing on public roads became restricted and the focus shifted to using
compact, closed circuits, which played to the strengths of the British designers.
3.2. The case of FGS 1929–2008
3.2.1. 1929–1949: success and establishing an architectural model
Enzo Ferrari first formed Scuderia Ferrari in 1929 as one of the earliest specialist
motorsport organizations (Yates, 1991). Subsequently the company developed both a
racing (Gestione Sportiva) and a road car manufacturing operation (Gestione Gran
Turismo). Here we focus primarily on the racing operation of Gestione Sportiva. The
original FGS was located in Modena in the Emilio-Romagna area of northern Italy.
Enzo was himself a former Grand Prix driver for the Alfa Romeo team, and Scuderia
Ferrari ran the official Alfa Romeo racing team from 1930 to 1937 during which time
they were successful at long-distance road racing events such as the Targa Florio,
Mille Miglia and Le Mans. In 1938, Alfa Romeo relocated their motorsport activities to
their factory premises in Portello, Milan, under the name of Alfa Corse (Nye, 1993).
This resulted in Enzo Ferrari severing his ties with Alfa Romeo and signing an
agreement not to race under his own name for 5 years. During the period 1940–1945,
Ferrari established a new business, Auto Avio Construzioni Ferrari, manufacturing
ball-bearing grinding machines (Williams, 2001). In 1943, they moved to new premises
to the south in the small town of Maranello.
In 1945, progress toward the first Ferrari racing car began when former Alfa Romeo
designer Gioachino Colombo traveled to Modena to discuss design of a new car, the
125, with Enzo Ferrari. Colombo had joined Alfa Romeo in 1924 and had produced
some of the most iconic Grand Prix cars of the 1930s. He recounted his conversation
with Ferrari: ‘Colombo – I want to go back to making racing-cars; I’ve had enough of
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utilities! What do you say: how would you propose to make a fifteen hundred?’
(Colombo, 1985, 16). The term ‘fifteen-hundred’ refers to the engine capacity in cubic
centimeters of Grand Prix cars at the time—note that the discussion starts with a clear
focus on the engine.
Colombo replied: ‘Listen – Maserati has a first-class eight-cylinder machine; the
English have the ERA six-cylinder, and Alfa have their own eight cylinder. In my view,
you should be making a twelve-cylinder.’ Colombo then noted that Ferrari smiled,
giving him ‘the confirmation he wanted of a decision he had already made some time ago’
(Colombo, 1985, 16). The Ferrari 125 (so named as the capacity of each of its 12
cylinders was 125 cc) made its race debut on 11 May 1947, at the Piacenza circuit in
Emiliano-Romagnolo. The chassis of the car was made of tubular steel, the
conventional approach during this time and was fabricated by chassis specialists
GILCO Autotelaio in Milan (Colombo, 1985).
The emerging architectural knowledge of Ferrari is, therefore, focused on the design
of the engine as the central component of the system, as Ferrari noted in his
autobiography: ‘In fact I have always given great importance to the engine and much
less to the chassis, endeavoring to squeeze as much power as possible in the conviction
that it is engine power which is – not 50 per cent but 80 per cent – responsible for
success on the track’ (Ferrari, 1963, 41–42).
At that time it was usual to produce both a single-seat ‘monoposto’ and twin-seat
‘gran turismo’ version, with bodies built by specialist bodybuilders such as Pininfarina,
in the Milan area. Ferrari also used Pirelli tyres (produced in Milan) and worked closely
with Shell Italiana: ‘Stefano Somazzi, in particular, a Swiss engineer of Shell Italiana’s,
worked with us closely and gave us his help in tackling a number of problems
concerning both fuels and lubrication’ (Ferrari, 1963, 145–146).
In summary, we see a philosophy of car design that focused primarily on the design of
the engine, with the other elements being very much secondary, and frequently
outsourced to local, specialist contractors. As is generally presented to be the case for
geographical clusters of firms, the knowledge needed to develop this process was all
held within the localized area of Milan, Bologna and Modena, with Ferrari gradually
absorbing and enacting the consensus architectural framework of the Italian Motor
Valley cluster, the technical and social interactions—in the Italian tradition the
engineers who worked together also spent many of their evenings dining and socializing
together—within this small region came to define an Italian approach to F1 racing.
3.2.2. 1950–1960: architectural consolidation
From 1950 Ferrari competed in the F1 World Championship. Figure 1 provides details
on their race performance during this time, along with a number of key events that are
noted during the case narrative. During the years that followed, Ferrari built on their
early success—they won their first World Championship in 1952, and in 1952 and 1953
won all the races in the championship. This dominance was clearly a vindication of their
philosophy of prioritizing engine development in the design of an F1 car—they were
embedding their particular architectural knowledge and focusing on improving areas of
component knowledge, particularly those relating to the engine. Other specialized
knowledge in particular component areas, was accessed from other countries, including
Roots superchargers from the USA and specialist bearings sourced from the UK:
‘. . .we were enabled later to develop this engine fully and perfectly only by the use of
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the special materials not then available, such as the famous thin-wall indiumised
bearings of Tony Vandervell, the meteoric builder of the Vanwall’ (Ferrari, 1963, 41).
From these observations, we can illustrate the way in which the knowledge
architecture has evolved both at a firm and cluster level. In the context of Ferrari there
appeared to be no question that the design should start with the engine, and no question
that the engine would be the most important component area of the car. Further,
Ferrari was embedded in a horizontal cluster of similar firms that comprised the North
Italian ‘Motor Valley’ cluster (Alfa Romeo, Maserati, Lancia), which all employed
similar, or the same, designers, who all approached their problem solving in similar
ways.
Ferrari’s domination during 1952 and 1953 proved hard to repeat, but in 1955 the
Lancia motorsport operation (Lancia Corse) was struggling to survive. With help from
Gianni Agnelli of Fiat, Ferrari negotiated the take-over of Lancia designs, which then
were integrated into the Ferrari racecars (Figure 1). Maserati too succumbed to
financial pressures and withdrew from racing in 1957 (Nye, 1993), effectively creating a
shift in the North Italian cluster from a horizontal agglomeration of competing firms to
a vertical configuration (Markusen, 1999) focused around Ferrari and their supply
chain. However, toward the end of the 1950s the English constructors emerged as a
competitive threat, led by father and son Charles and John Cooper (Beck-Burridge
and Walton, 2000). The Cooper was a small, light racecar that had been originally
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Figure 1. Ferrari performance 1950–2008 (percentage of Grand Prix wins during each year).
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developed for racing in junior formula, such as Formula 2, using chassis components
taken from the Fiat Topolino car (Nye, 1993). In contrast to Ferrari’s ‘engine centric’
architecture, the design of the Cooper focused on the chassis and maximizing the grip
of the wheels. Unlike Ferrari, they did not build their own engine, but used an adapted
fire pump engine built by Coventry Climax in the UK (Couldwell, 2003). A key part of
the Cooper design was that the engine sat immediately behind the driver—known as
a mid-engine layout—thereby giving the car better weight distribution and reducing
overall weight by removing the need for a long heavy transmission, as was necessary
with the front engine Ferraris (Lawrence, 1998).
Enzo Ferrari had strong views on the positioning of the engine as recounted by
Giochino Colombo: ‘For some time I had been thinking about this project [a rear
engine design], and I’d been studying some possible solutions in my spare time. Enzo
Ferrari listened very closely to my proposal. He wanted to know all the details, and
asked for explanations which he followed with great attention. And then he vetoed the
whole scheme! ‘‘No’’, he said, ‘‘it’s always been the ox that pulls the cart’’ ’ (Colombo,
1985, 14). Enzo’s response found its way into Ferrari and motorsport legend, as an
example of the Italian philosophy on car design. This suggests the following
proposition:
Proposition 1: Business, technical and social networks within limited geographical
areas—often described as industrial clusters—circumscribe the early evolution of
different regional architectural frameworks in an international industry.
Communication channels are local, local focus filters out alternative ideas and problem
solving occurs within the local architectural model.
3.2.3. 1961–1980: competitive challenges and component solutions
By 1960, the success of the English mid-engine design had an impact on Enzo and, in
preparation for new regulations in 1961, and despite considerable in-house opposition,
he allowed the team’s ex-Alfa Romeo Chief Engineer, Carlo Chiti, to build a prototype
mid-engine Ferrari. This proved highly successful in testing and led to the development
of the Ferrari 156 ‘Sharknose’ that dominated the 1961 season (as shown in Figure 1).
Although the move of the engine from front to behind the driver could be seen as a shift
in architectural knowledge, in many ways it was not, as the design process was still
rooted in the ‘engine-frame-body’ logic of Ferrari. The focus of the design was a new V6
engine and the car still used the tubular chassis concept that was used in the Ferrari 125
back in 1948. Indeed, even the car’s ‘156’ nomenclature was due to the engine
configuration of 1.5 l, six cylinders.
However, Ferrari’s success during 1961 was soon forgotten as a new chassis design
was pioneered by UK constructor Lotus. Up to this point the dominant design had
been the tubular ‘space-frame’ chassis, with the structure formed from welded steel
tubes. Founder and technical brains behind Lotus Racing, Colin Chapman, had
followed Cooper’s route into F1. Chapman was exploring a way to both improve the
rigidity of the chassis and overcome the difficult task of fabricating aluminum fuel tanks
to sit inside the space-frame structure. The problem-solving approach they followed was
to redesign the chassis and replace the tubes with box sections that would provide
increased rigidity with the fuel carried within them in rubber bags (Nye, 1993). This
innovation—the monocoque chassis—was incorporated into the Lotus 25 of 1962 and
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marked a major shift in chassis technology. It was not until 1964, some two seasons
after the launch of the Lotus 25, that Ferrari responded with a car that used some of the
concepts of the monocoque chassis, although these were still based around the tubular
structure, with stress-bearing aluminum sheets shaped and riveted over the tubes known
as ‘skinned space-frames’ (Nye, 1993). Ferrari’s designs at this time were essentially
stopgap while they developed a new engine to respond to the regulation change for the
1966 season when the engine size would be increased from 1.5 to 3.0 l.
Ferrari were consistently beaten by the English designers. This lack of competitive-
ness took a further negative turn for FGS in 1967 when a new Lotus design, the Type
49, was complemented by a new F1 engine specifically designed by Cosworth
Engineering in Northamptonshire, UK (Robson, 1999). The major innovation of this
design was that the engine effectively became part of the chassis. It was a fully stressed
component of the car and, therefore, did not require the supporting steel frames that
were necessary for nonload-bearing engines, such as the Ferrari. In 1968, a Ford
Cosworth engine, capable of winning a Grand Prix in the right chassis, could be
purchased for £7500 (Beck-Burridge and Walton, 2000). This led to the late 1960s and
early 1970s being totally dominated by British teams. In 1969 and 1971, every Grand
Prix was won by a car with one of these engines.
This created even greater pressure at Ferrari to improve performance. Technical
Director Mauro Forghieri had been replaced by Sandro Colombo, who decided to try a
new approach to improve the chassis of the Ferrari. He explored the possibility of
fabricating the chassis in the UK, and approached chassis specialist John Thompson
who ran TC Prototypes in Wellingborough, Northamptonshire. ‘Colombo turned up at
our place seeking someone to build him some chassis. He showed us the drawings,
we gave him a price and he accepted it straightaway I was very impressed with the detail
of the drawings’ he remembers. ‘What they wanted was a fairly straightforward
monocoque and we just did as they asked and built it. It was nice and light. They as
much as admitted that doing a monocoque was a learning curve for them, and I never
expected things to go any further. They just wanted to acquire the technology. Skinned
space-frames was all they knew’ (Tremayne, 2001, 144).
However, despite these problem-solving attempts to improve the chassis, the car still
remained uncompetitive, and in 1973 Mauro Forghieri was brought back to lead
development. His comments reflect a view that the historical approach of Ferrari to
construct their own chassis should have been maintained: ‘I came back in ’73. In this
period there was a man sent by Fiat who asked people to do the chassis in England.
You know, in my opinion, the chassis has to be rigid and light. It doesn’t count in which
material it is done and the way in which you do it. Especially considering the possibility
you have here [in Maranello] to do some kind of chassis. So in my opinion you have
to use the ability of the people who are here. You cannot use people 2,500 miles away
from here it becomes too difficult’ (Mauro Forghieri, interview).
Although it did not meet with Forghieri’s approval, the move to use a British
contractor to produce a chassis, albeit designed by Ferrari, was a major step away from
their existing component knowledge in the area of chassis fabrication. This and earlier
steps illustrate an important shift in Ferrari’s focus for sources of competitive
advantage. Having been clearly outperformed by the Cooper mid-engine and the Lotus
chassis innovations, they made attempts to imitate successful designs, but only within
their existing architecture of the space frame chassis. This accords with Henderson and
Clark’s (1990) notion that successful incumbents may not grasp the full significance
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of innovations that are based upon a different architecture. In this case, we see Ferrari’s
partial response—the skinned space frame and outsourcing of the fabrication of the
chassis—to the monocoque chassis developed from the distinct ‘chassis-body-engine’
architecture of the UK cluster, as exemplified by Cooper and Lotus.
Proposition 2: As competitive pressures become significant, firm problem solving will seek
new component knowledge but will fit it into existing firm—and cluster-level architectural
concepts. Component knowledge may be modeled on perceptions of foreign technology,
but information filtering will tend to adapt technical advances to make them compatible
with preconceived architectural and existing component knowledge, typically failing to
provide the intended improvement in performance. This outcome is particularly likely for
knowledge sourced from other clusters with alternative architectural knowledge biases.
Forghieri’s focus had been on developing his own design of engine, the Boxer ‘Flat 12’,
a 12-cylinder engine with the cylinders horizontal to the ground, giving it a very low-
center of gravity. The fact that the engine was a 12 cylinder (and so mirroring the first
Ferrari) meant that it was also capable of producing greater levels of power than the
8-cylinder Ford Cosworth. The 312T (312 representing 3.0 l, 12 cylinder)—was
developed around this engine and focused on making the most of its low and wide
profile, which made it both powerful and aerodynamically effective. With this car, and a
succession of evolutionary versions, Ferrari was able to dominate the period from 1974
through to 1979. However, the success of the 312T resulted in more radical attempts
by the competition to find a way round the Ferrari’s superiority. This came, once more,
from Lotus, who had pioneered a new aerodynamic design that used the air flowing
under the car to create a low-pressure area to suck the car onto the track. Racing driver
Mario Andretti described the Lotus 78 as being ‘painted on the road’ (Crombac, 2001,
284). Ferrari again needed to look to new ways to restore their success on the racetrack.
3.2.4. 1981–1988: competitive failure and changing architecture
In the early 1980s, Ferrari endured very poor performance on the racetrack. This led to
a series of new and significant technical appointments. First, in 1981, following a direct
approach by Enzo Ferrari, English designer Dr Harvey Postlethwaite was appointed to
the technical team, initially working alongside the long-standing Forghieri.
Postlethwaite had worked with a long line of British constructors and was responsible
for the success of the Hesketh team in 1974. During the early 1980s F1 cars used very
powerful turbo-charged engines, which played to Ferrari’s strengths, except that this
required advances in chassis design to ensure that the power was translated to
performance on the track. Postlethwaite’s role was to help develop chassis technology at
Ferrari, as recounted by Forghieri (interview): ‘So Harvey [Postlethwaite] came to us.
We did the first chassis in aluminum honeycomb and it was a mistake and afterwards
we did it in carbon fibre. I learnt a lot at that time with Harvey.’
Postlethwaite moved to Italy and very much engaged in the Ferrari culture (Roebuck,
1999), but Ferrari’s performance was still very poor. This led to a second appointment,
that of John Barnard, formerly with British constructor McLaren: ‘When I went to
Ferrari I think it was a move by Enzo Ferrari to make the chassis side more important,
to give the chassis side a boost. I suspect it wasn’t just about doing the latest breed of
composite chassis because they already had Harvey Postlethwaite there and Harvey
knew about composites. They’d actually been making some composite chassis but it was
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more a case of bringing somebody in that would dominate some of the engine side and
bring in much more thinking about the chassis concept and the package and all the rest
of it’ (John Barnard, Interview).
Barnard’s description of ‘giving the chassis side a boost’ was an attempt to change the
architectural knowledge of Ferrari. This was not simply a case of developing a better
chassis by using British contractors, this was changing the relationship between the key
component areas: someone who could ‘dominate’ the engine side and bring it into line
with the other areas, thereby shifting the architectural knowledge base.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the appointment of John Barnard in 1986 was
that he refused to move to Italy and established a design and development center in
Surrey, referred to as the Guildford Technical Office (GTO): ‘When they contacted me
originally I said ‘‘No, thanks very much I don’t want to move to Italy’’ . . . they then
turn around and say ‘‘But what if you could set something up in England?’’ and you
think ‘‘Hang on, all this money and I can set up my own place in England? I’ve got to
give it a go really’’.’ This proved to be a particularly tough assignment, as Barnard
himself reflected, in the challenges regarding communication channels:
I was overall technically in charge and that was my position in charge of the engine and
everything. Obviously I couldn’t be in day to day charge of the engine because a) I was based in
Britain and b) with a thing that big you have to work through managers so you have to be
interfacing through one or two people but what I had to get into their head was that the engine
had to be part of the package you couldn’t just let the engine designer say ‘‘Well I’m going to
hang the water pumps out here, I don’t want to hang it on the chassis like that, I want to do
it . . .’’ so you have to then dictate to the engine people how you want the package to work and
that was quite tough initially . . . tough because you’re fighting the old guard, the old brigade,
the old ‘‘We’ve been doing this for 30 years, don’t tell us what to do’’ kind of thing . . . (John
Barnard, Interview).
Barnard reflected on the role of Enzo Ferrari in creating the changes that took place
in his organization: ‘. . . at the end of the day it’s what needed to happen, it was probably
things like that, that Enzo saw were fundamentally wrong with the team but he didn’t
know how to change them. Bring this hard-arsed, bull-at-the-gate, bloody Englishman
in and however it happens’ (John Barnard, Interview).
This period represents the time that FGS began to diverge from the expected path of
ever more internally focused component knowledge changes hung on an obsolete
chassis. Rather, Enzo Ferrari himself seems to have recognized that FGS must
incorporate the changes coming out of the British cluster, and that only bringing in
British engineers could accomplish this. That this was a commitment to fundamental
change was endorsed by the move to appoint Barnard as technical director, while
allowing him to remain in England at the GTO. It appears that Postlethwaite provided
the latest technical component knowledge about chassis development, but that his
immersion in the Ferrari culture kept him from changing the dominant logic, the
architectural knowledge, of FGS about how to build a winning racecar. Barnard, in
an oversight position and isolated from the organizational culture’s influence, began to
restructure Ferrari’s fundamental process architecture.
Proposition 3: Changing tacit component knowledge is encouraged by incorporating
experienced individuals from a location with alternative architecture, but if isolated
within the focal firm’s system, they are unlikely to change its architectural knowledge.
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Key individuals from the alternative architectural system can act as communication
channels, but local filters must be by passed if architectural level problems are to be
solved. The FGS experience at this stage suggests:
P3A: Top-level recognition of an existential crisis is needed to force the existing
architectural framework to open up to alternative experience.
P3B: A change agent with deep knowledge of the alternative architecture must be
incorporated to initiate restructuring the dominant logic of the firm.
P3C: Initiation of alternative problem-solving techniques requires protection, even
isolation, of the individuals involved from organizational pressures toward inertia.
3.2.5. 1989–1993
Enzo’s death in 1990 led to a very different dynamic in the leadership of FGS. Barnard
left Ferrari at the end of his 3-year contract that expired on 31 October 1989. He was
replaced by Argentine Enrique Scalabroni (Motorsport, August 1989, 773), but
Barnard’s absence was short lived and he returned in 1992 to continue the UK
operation.
They came back again and said ‘Well we would quite like to start another English arm.’ I said
‘Yes I am interested, but don’t make me overall Technical Director, because I can’t do that
from England. So they said what do you suggest? I said ‘I think if you allow us to build a big
enough set-up we could be an R&D centre in England that would be working on the next car.
You need a complete team in Italy to race and develop that racing car while we work on the
next one.’ So we set this place up and at that time we had our own wind tunnel operation as
well. We had an aerodynamic group here who built our own model bits and pieces and we
even built the rolling road that we fitted into the British Aerospace Filton tunnel at Bristol
(John Barnard, Interview).
3.2.6. 1994–1997
During this period a new leadership team at Ferrari, led by Jean Todt, was putting
together a plan to bring success. Within this they recognized the need to integrate the
whole operation in one location. ‘Jean Todt had come along and naturally - he had been
talking to me about it, so it wasn’t a secret - wanted to get everything back based in
Italy. They couldn’t do this unless they got the right people. My contract finished in the
spring of 1997’ (John Barnard, Interview).
A key part of the plan was to bring in World Champion driver Michael Schumacher,
who had arrived from British-based constructor Benetton. Todt sought his advice on
building a new technical team. ‘Once we had Michael, of course, I asked him who was
good in your team, which is normal and he spoke to me about Ross [Brawn] and Rory
[Byrne], so I contacted them’ (Jean Todt, interview). This led to the recruitment of both
Brawn (technical director) and Byrne (Chief Designer). Their first priority was to
integrate the operation back to Maranello: ‘. . . there had been a recognition that
designing a car in England and building in Italy was not the easiest of things and that
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really we had to move on from that. So when I had my earlier discussions with Jean
about how the company would be structured that was one of the objectives. When I
arrived in 1997 we had to set up a design office at Maranello’ (Ross Brawn, interview).
3.2.7. 1998–2008: recombination to create a unique architecture
In the final phase of the reinvention of FGS, it was important that the new knowledge
and approaches that had been developed in the UK-based operation were successfully
integrated back into the Maranello site. A key part of this was the engagement of those
involved in the engine design and development: ‘I really felt that we could get into a
situation where we could have an engine completely integrated into the car and that
must be the best situation so one of the things that was very important to myself and
Rory was to have someone here who understood that and luckily Paolo Martinelli
[Engine Director] very quickly appreciated our ideas and was completely receptive to
the idea of a fully integrated engine as part of the car package’ (Ross Brawn, interview).
During this period the emphasis was placed on integrating the knowledge developed
in the UK facility back into the operation at Maranello. This was needed, as although
the two operations enabled new knowledge to be absorbed, their ability to innovate and
compete was impeded by the distance between the operations: as summarized by Paolo
Martinelli (interview): ‘It was the correct decision [locating in the UK] if you want to
recover through technology and find the knowledge you need . . . but coming back a
year from now, even a link with the telephone or with the telephone lines is not so fast
as it is now and telecommunications by fax or even email is not so prompt, it cannot
give the team spirit if you have 2000 km distance. Sometimes you need to be by the car,
or by the chart, working shoulder to shoulder, is very important.’
An important change to the effort to incorporate the British architectural knowledge
into FGS took place during this period. It was recognized that the current operational
responsibilities of the Technical Director must be pursued in Italy. The regional effect is
emphasized by the fact that it was not Barnard and his operation that was transplanted
into Maranello, but a new operation was built up by another group of technical
specialists who had been located in the British cluster. Ross Brawn was able to bring an
entire team from the British cluster, which offered a level of support for architectural
change that was not available before. This final stage in the development of the
evolution of FGS meant that the differing channels, filters and problem-solving
approaches which had necessarily evolved in the different locations now had to be
integrated through co-location. It was only this final phase that allowed the
development of the new architecture that was essentially a hybrid of old and new
brought together in one location through a new management team.
Proposition 4: Integration of new, spatially remote architectural knowledge into the
firm’s dominant logic requires that key proponents must eventually be brought into the
core of the firm. Combining the new architecture with the firm’s inherited architecture
to establish new communication channels, redefine filter parameters and recast
problem-solving approaches requires direct involvement. From the FGS experience,
we derive the following rules:
P4A: When the change agent is relocated to the core of the firm, support structures
must be transported as well if the agent is to be effective.
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P4B: The change agent must be given top management support and the organization’s
dominant logic must be restructured to support the new conceptual architecture.
P4C: Future innovation from the base of the restructured architecture requires
recombination of the old and new frameworks.
The key transition for FGS was the step to embed in the British cluster. It appears
that most firms, and most clusters, faced with an emergent architectural logic that offers
consistently superior performance become mired in seeking solutions in new component
technologies grafted onto the established or dominant logic architecture of the firm
(Prahalad and Bettis, 1986; Christensen, 1997). Sticking with success by reinforcing
current architectural knowledge and engaging primarily in local search for new
component knowledge is easy to understand, but is the mechanism that creates the
inertia which drives the ultimate failure of firms and clusters (Pouder and St. John,
1996). Cycling through multiple iterations of such a process leads firms into capability
traps where increasing levels of investment only raise the cost of eventual competitive
failure (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Ferrari, however, discovered the key insight that the
British constructors had a superior concept for building a racecar, and determined to
incorporate this knowledge into their design process. In the case of Ferrari, the mythical
status of Enzo Ferrari allowed him to make and enforce the decision to locate in the
UK Motorsport Valley. His competitive drive overcame his preconceptions of what
made for a competitive racecar, and his status within the firm enforced structural
changes that were very much foreign to the old logic of FGS.
4. Discussion and conclusions
From the case, we have developed process logic for the specifics of knowledge
transformation in FGS. We have acknowledged that other firms have successfully
transformed their dominant logic, though it seems a comparatively rare occurrence. We
propose a model that could be applied generally by firms faced with a competitive
challenge from another region to their architectural understanding of their industry
sector to suggest, with reference to the structural solutions derived from the FGS
experience, a systematic approach to a competitive solution and to an analytical
framework.
Figure 2 offers a double-loop approach to component and architectural learning, or
incorporation of new knowledge, in firms faced with severe international competitive
challenges (Argyris, 1976; Bathelt and Cohendet, 2014). Integrating our various
propositions in Figure 2, we see that there are a number of considerations involving the
spatial characteristics of knowledge flows that have implications for the growth and
development of firms. The first is that as firms develop their existing localized
knowledge, it will evolve into a particular dominant product design and organizational
logic. This will form the basis of growth and expansion through development of the
component areas that are elements of the architectural knowledge, but not involve
changes in the architectural knowledge—effectively the left hand, or original dominant
logic, loop in Figure 2. Firms can develop successfully without fundamentally
changing their architectural knowledge and by simply improving component areas
as they compete at home and initially expand into new regions. This is the
realm of benchmarking local, regional and national competition, using established
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communication channels and problem-solving approaches. New ideas from other
regions are tried, but typically are drastically modified to fit the existing architectural
knowledge.
At a later stage, international competition, whether attacking the home market or
in foreign markets, is recognized and its component knowledge is added to the mix.
As with local component knowledge, adaptation is likely, but in this case the gulf
between dominant logics (architectural knowledge pools) suggests complete misunder-
standing of how the new technical know-how is incorporated in the system is likely.
Bingham and Davis (2012) describe various learning sequences, but find that firms
often struggle unsuccessfully with changing processes to admit knowledge from low-
status locations even in the face of admitted failure.
If, however, due to the continued superior performance of foreign competitors or
to discontinuities in the external environment, the organization is unable to provide
sufficient performance enhancement through development of component knowledge
and faces competitive failure, then the double-loop effect (the right hand, or
restructured dominant logic, loop in Figure 2) may occur. This is the point at which
the imagination of most incumbent firms appears to fail, and additional nonproductive
journeys around the left-hand loop are taken, following the old logic but to ever less
benefit. For the uniquely thoughtful or lucky firm that recognizes the need for
fundamental process change, our framework suggests that geography can play a critical
role in the evolution of architectural knowledge within the firm. This is because the
regionally embedded nature of architectural knowledge (Tallman et al., 2004) means
that firms can only change their internal architectural knowledge—their dominant
logics—through disassociating themselves from their ‘old’ regional or cluster architec-
tural knowledge. We also demonstrate that the cluster-relatedness of architectural
Figure 2. A double-loop model of geographic learning in a multinational enterprise.
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knowledge makes identification, if not incorporation, of the potential source of new
knowledge obvious to industry insiders. However, final incorporation of an alternative
architecture requires eventual reconnection back to their roots, their original logic, to
create a hybrid architectural knowledge based on a dialectic recombination of the old
and new (Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1993).
In this sense, we are suggesting that development of architectural knowledge is both
evolutionary and highly path-dependent (Henderson and Clark, 1990), but that
geography provides a mechanism by which firms can identify, access and eventually
incorporate unique architectural knowledge, engendering new evolutionary paths and
levels of performance. These implications go beyond the level of the firm, and suggest
that clusters may transform architectural knowledge through such pathways of
reconfiguration. In this sense, the vertical cluster centered on FGS in Northern Italy
became transformed by the incorporation of architectural knowledge from the
horizontal cluster in Britain’s Motorsport Valley. However, the hybrid architectural
knowledge that developed in the Northern Italian region was distinctive in that it
amalgamated both the engine-centric and the chassis/aero-centric knowledge of the two
regions to create a new architecture of knowledge not easily replicated by those firms
in the British cluster.
Firms do initially learn from the spillovers and comparisons that they can gain from
their local cluster (Maskell, 2001), but the common architectural knowledge and limited
technological innovation inherent to local component knowledge will eventually lead
the cluster and its firms into a downward performance spiral (Pouder and St. John,
1996). We find that an expansive view of the geography of learning is essential to
fundamental change at the firm and cluster level, as difficult as this is to accomplish.
Foreign locations provide much greater variation in component and architectural
knowledge. The first of these suggests the potential gain, whereas the second suggests
the potential difficulty of foreign learning, but at some point it seems to become
essential. What foreign clusters do offer are specific target locations for learning: FGS
knew that the English ‘Motorsport Valley’ was the source of chassis and aerodynamic
technology, so that any effort to incorporate such knowledge could at least be targeted
appropriately (Henry et al., 1996).
Studying alternative foreign locations and the interplay between them may also
provide benefits to scholars hoping to understand the evolution of clusters and regions.
Persistent, distinguishable architectural knowledge can develop at the regional level,
hence the Italian focus on the engine as the key to a winning racecar, contrasted for
decades with the English focus on the design and materials of the chassis for the
same purpose. If initial conditions can be determined through a comparison across
geographical distance, then changes in knowledge, and particularly architectural
knowledge, become apparent and traceable when addressed in the international setting.
We have been able to present the transformation of FGS in detail because the
movement of knowledge and people from England to Italy is easily distinguished.
Local innovations do move, but while informal spillovers of knowledge may be valuable
to the recipient firms, their pathways tend to be obscure and often beyond the reach of
researchers.
The model that we have developed focuses on firm-level learning, but there are
wider implications for the development and transformations of regions. The
‘evolutionary turn’ in economic geography places innovation and knowledge
development as central to the processes of transformation of economic landscapes
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(Boschma and Martin, 2007). Maskell and Malmberg (2007) suggest a link between the
micro processes of firm-level innovation, selection and retention and evolutionary
processes of knowledge creation at the regional level. Maskell (2014) recognizes that
local economic systems have always required some degree of outside knowledge input
to stay competitive. Our framework has broader implications for the mechanisms
by which regions may evolve new knowledge and, therefore, adapt to changing
exogenous landscapes. Economic geography has clearly established the existence of
industry clusters, but has limited tools for understanding the mechanisms by which
these distinctive locales influence the activities of companies in international industries.
We believe that strategic management models offer relevant tools and propose the
model development herein as one approach to understanding the relevance of location
to strategy and of strategic management to the exploitation of locations.
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